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Abstract 
In this study we discuss and empirically test the assertion that over the last two decades 
multinational enterprises’ (MNEs’) configuration of value-adding activities has shifted from a 
sparse and simple (host-home) international division of labor among the foreign affiliates to a 
more specialized and ‘advanced’ global value chain configuration in which MNEs locate fine-
sliced parts of the value chain at the most efficient locations. Using data on trade flows of U.S. 
affiliates in 56 host countries between 1983 and 2003 we find some indications of a trend in the 
direction of global value chain specialization. In particular among US affiliates in developing 
countries the proportion of host-host, intra-firm trade has increased significantly during the 
observed period of time. Conversely, the proportion of host-home and inter-firm trade has 
diminished. We interpret this as indicating both value chain disaggregation (vertical 
specialization) and MNEs’ systematic exploitation of factor cost differentials across countries. 
We also find that the absolute levels of all types of trade flows have increased. Hence, it is the 
relative, and not the absolute, changes in the trade flow patterns of US affiliates that gives 
credibility to the global value chain assertion.  
 
Keywords:  FDI, US affiliate sales, globalization, value chain specialization 
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IS THERE A TREND TOWARDS GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN SPECIALIZATION? 
- AN EXAMINATION OF CROSS BORDER SALES OF US FOREIGN AFFILIATES 
 
1. Introduction 
It is the general contention that the removal of trade and investment barriers around the world, as 
well as falling transport and communication costs have triggered a change of the global FDI-
pattern in the direction of a more pronounced and sophisticated division of labor within the 
multinational enterprise (MNE) (Zaheer and Manrakhan, 2001; Dicken, 2003; Kotabe and 
Murray, 2004). MNEs are seen as shifting from dispersed to concentrated global value chain 
(GVC) configurations (Porter, 1986), meaning that the various value chain activities of the 
corporation, instead of being replicated from country to country (and therefore ‘dispersed’), are 
being concentrated and specialized in one or a few locations where the factor endowment is the 
most favorable. Hence, MNEs develop into ‘differentiated networks’ (Nohria and Ghoshal, 
1994) or ‘meta-nationality’ (Doz et al., 2001) characterized by an outspoken international 
division of labor and resulting strong interdependency between the affiliations. International 
management scholars have translated this phenomenon into a surge for ‘global integration’, 
‘transnational strategies’ (Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Yip, 1989), and 
economic geographers have used terms like ‘global production networks’ and ‘global commodity 
chains’ to describe the new division of labor incorporated or ‘governed’ by the MNE (Gereffi, 
1999; Schmitz, 2003; Humphrey, 2005). In the business press the attention has foremost been on 
the relocation – offshoring - of value chain activities from the MNE home countries in the 
developed market economies to low cost developing countries, such as Mexico, China and India. 
Not surprisingly, offshoring is also prominent on the agenda of policymakers given its impact on 
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and relationship with national labor markets, national competitiveness, and terms of trade (e.g. 
Economic Policy Institute, 2005; Smyth, 2006; Farrell 2005 versus Levy 2005). 
There is amble evidence (see e.g. Lewin and Peeters, 2006) that offshoring has grown 
significantly over the last ten years. Not only has ‘traditional’ offshoring of manufacturing 
activities increased, but new forms of offshoring, of services (‘white collar jobs’, ‘back office 
activities’) and R&D, have emerged (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005; Ramamurti, 2004; Grossman 
and Helpman, 2005; Antras et al. 2006; Yeaple, 2006) - often referred to as the second and third 
wave of offshoring, respectively (McKinsey Global Institute, 2007; Farell, 2004, 2006; Engardio 
et al. 2003).  
However, it is important to note that the offshoring phenomenon as such, implies a 
relocation of value chain activities – a ‘functional migration’ – from MNE home countries to 
foreign countries – but not necessarily a more concentrated or specialized GVC. There is amble 
anecdotal evidence of GVC specialization making up a natural part of the offshoring process (see 
e.g. Robinson and Kalakota, 2004) – notably through the establishment of shared services centers 
within the multinational corporation – but to our knowledge no large-scale studies have been 
carried out which can confirm or deny a juxtaposition of offshoring and GVC specialization.  
Hence, the assertion – or ‘thesis’ - that the MNEs in general are moving towards GVC 
specialization does not seem to rest on solid empirical basis – if any at all. It is thus the aim of 
this study to examine the GVC specialization ‘thesis’ empirically. We do that on a 
comprehensive data set on trade flows of US foreign affiliates during a period of twenty years 
(1983-2003). By using this new database we establish fine-grained measures of different types of 
cross border sales that result as a consequence of non-market seeking FDI of US MNEs.  
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Our contribution is twofold. First, by fine-slicing the broad notion of GVC configuration 
in different constitutive components we provide a more intricate picture of the supposed trend 
towards global value chains of MNEs. Second, we show that the share of total cross border 
affiliate sales (relative to local sales) has not really increased over the last two decades. In other 
words, vertical disintegration of MNE global value chains has not significantly changed the 
overall balance between cross border sales and local sales of MNE affiliates. However, if we 
look isolated at the cross border sales pattern of US affiliates some changes do emerge – in terms 
of the balance between inter- and intra-affiliate sales as well as in relation to host-home versus 
host-host sales. The most significant single change of the cross border affiliate trade pattern 
appears to be the growth of host-host intra-firm sales – but only from affiliates in developing 
countries, not in developed countries.  
By investigating the underlying structure of cross border sales, we also follow up on 
Buckley and Ghauri (2004: 81) who argued that the analysis of the changing configuration 
strategy of MNEs and its impact on the world economy is one of the big questions in 
international business. Our study has implications for the broader globalization debate by 
providing new arguments based on empirical material - something we consider highly needed for 
a balanced discussion of the pros and cons of globalization. 
The balance of the article is organized as follows: In the next section (section 2) we make 
a further account for the global value chain concept and its theoretical basis. Our interpretations 
and categorizations of different affiliate trade flows lead to the formulation of a set of hypotheses 
revolving around a test of the GVC specialization thesis. In section 3 we measure and describe 
cross border sales of US foreign affiliates. In section 4 the hypotheses pertaining to the asserted 
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reconfiguration of value-adding activities of MNEs – the GVC specialization thesis – are tested, 
and subsequently we interpret and discuss the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theory and hypotheses  
In order to properly understand the notion of GVC and its empirical counterpart, cross 
border sales, it is important to sketch the different types of sales that occur as a result of MNE 
activity, most notably local sales and cross border sales. The distinction between local sales and 
cross border sales to a large extent mirrors the conventional, basic theoretical distinction between 
horizontal and vertical FDI. Horizontal FDI accumulates local sales, vertical FDI cross border 
sales. Horizontal FDI arises as a substitute for exporting and a desire to place production close to 
customers and thereby avoid trade costs, being both transportation costs and trade barriers 
(Buckley and Casson, 1981). An alternative designation of this type of FDI is market-seeking 
FDI. Most of the discussion on globalization, and definitely the debate on GVC specialization, 
refer to the non-market seeking type of FDI. Vertical FDI is traditionally related to the desire of 
MNEs to exploit factor cost differentials in locations that are relatively abundant with different 
factors of production (Braconier et al. 2005; Markusen, 1995). The term vertical FDI is used 
loosely referring to: (i) resource exploiting MNE activities in a foreign country to serve the home 
market in a more efficient way; (ii) the concentration of production activities abroad which are 
subsequently shipped back to the parent in the home country (intra-firm exports); and (iii) the 
splitting up of the value chain in multiple countries increasing the intra-firm exports between 
affiliates located in several host countries. The overall characteristic of all these types of FDI is 
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that they are initiated out of (anticipated) factor cost differentials and are non-market seeking.1 
Evidently, the exploitation of factor cost differentials by MNEs implies cross border sales; 
otherwise the affiliate would only compete with local firms having access to the same 
(beneficial) factor conditions. So, GVC specialization is associated with cross border sales – not 
local sales.  
However, there are no signs of a fundamental change in the balance between local and 
cross border affiliate sales, see Table 1. The table shows accumulated local sales and cross 
border sales of US foreign affiliates during the period 1983-2003. Absolute t-values of equality 
of means test first five years = last five years indicate that cross border sales have not increased 
significantly in relation to local sales. As can be seen in Table 1, the proportion of cross border 
US affiliate sales is constantly approximately 1/3 of total sales during the observed period of 
time, with minor differences between developed and developing countries. These figures 
correspond with results reported by others (e.g. Brainard, 1997). 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
Because global specialization allows MNEs to arbitrage factor cost differences between 
countries, Deardorff (1979) described a ‘chain of comparative advantage’ wherein countries 
                                                 
1 Acknowledging that the early works on non-market seeking FDI generally focused on unskilled labor intensive 
activities, increasingly MNEs seek knowledge-intensive resources abroad. This shift from unskilled to skilled labor 
has also led to new terminology in an attempt to capture this phenomenon, e.g. knowledge seeking FDI (Nachum 
and Zaheer, 1995). Strictly speaking the underlying rationale for both unskilled and skilled labor has not changed 
however. In both cases, MNEs arise to take advantage of international factor-cost differences and geographically 
split up their production process (Carr et al., 2001). Incorporating future factor cost differentials that arise as a 
consequence of relative factor endowments, MNEs are not only interested in relatively unskilled labor but also 
highly-skilled white collar workers that are becoming increasingly scarce in their home countries. 
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specialize in different intermediate products according to factor cost differences. Kogut (1985) 
extended this analysis to the level of the firm, suggesting that MNEs should locate different 
value chain activities according to their relative use of factor inputs. Yet countries differ not only 
in terms of factor costs, but also in terms of the “availability of particular skills” (Yip, 1989: 37) 
and more generally in terms of “the quality, quantity and configuration of its material, human 
and institutional resources, including ‘soft’ resources such as inter-organizational linkages, the 
nature of its educational system, and organizational and managerial know-how” (Westney, 1985, 
cited by Ghoshal, 1987: 433). Hence the potential for comparative advantage-based 
specialization seems to be much larger than a simple factor cost view would suggest: in 
principle, assuming zero coordination or transportation costs, each value chain activity, or even 
each task, could be optimally located in a different country to extract unique local resources.  
In cases where MNEs are localising value chain activities across country borders, one 
may speak of global value chain configurations (Porter, 1986). Porter (1986) distinguishes 
between dispersed and concentrated global value chain configurations. In the former, a company 
locates each value chain activity in a scattered manner, where value chain activities are replicated 
from country to country. In some countries, only a few activities, such as marketing and sales, 
are carried out, whereas the corporation may replicate the full range of activities of the value 
chain in others, thereby forming ‘mini-replica’. In contrast, firms may configure their value chain 
in such a way that the individual activity is carried out at a few locations or at only one. In the 
extreme case, all of a firm’s value chain activities are exercised in different countries, taking full 
advantage of factor endowment differentials. The local subsidiary is the sole performer of 
specific activities in the firm’s value chain and, as such, the subsidiary is assigned a corporate 
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world mandate (Frost et al., 2000; Holm and Pedersen, 2000). In other words, an international 
division of labor takes place within the corporation’s value chain. 
We can infer from the above that global value chain specialization has two dimensions: 
an organizational and a geographical. The organizational dimension pertains to the 
disaggregation (or ‘fine-slicing’) and modularization of the value chain into independent units 
with a sought minimum of mutual interfaces (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). The typical 
sequence of the MNE is that multiple, replicated value chain activities are consolidated into one 
or a few geographically centralized units (e.g. shared services centers in finance and accounting). 
In turn, the horizontal consolidation of the various value-adding activities within the corporation 
allows for a more fine-sliced vertical disaggregation of activities. Subsequently, the individual 
value-adding activity is located where factor costs are most beneficial for the exercise of that 
particular activity.  
Porter’s global value chain configuration framework (Porter, 1986) reflects this 
dichotomy very nicely in so far as the optimal value chain configuration of the MNE is described 
as a tradeoff between benefits of locating value-adding activities according to factor endowment 
and costs of coordination in terms of flows of information and people. A re-configuration of the 
MNE value chain in the direction of a more advanced international division of labor within the 
corporation will have substantial implications for the trade flows – sales – of the foreign 
affiliates and the parent. If such a GVC specialization is indeed a correct description of reality, 
we can identify at least two ways - capturing both the organizational and the geographical 
dimension - in which cross border affiliate sales flows potentially are affected: (1) A changing 
balance between inter- and intra-firm affiliate sales; (2) A changing balance between host-home 
and host-host sales.  
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In the following we will discuss – one by one - how we translate the effects of GVC 
specialization into these two main types of affiliate sales flows. 
 
2.1 Inter-firm versus intra-firm affiliate sales  
As a first implication of increased GVC specialization we would expect more intra-firm cross 
border affiliate sales – relative to inter-firm cross border sales. This has to do with the previously 
mentioned disaggregation of the MNE value chain. All else being equal, the more division of 
labor between the MNE affiliates the more intra-firm sales. Conversely, the local sales oriented 
mini-replica MNE affiliation comprises all or most value-adding activities and sells basically 
finished goods and services to local, independent firms. A dispersed GVC configuration (Porter, 
1986) would consist of multiple, horizontal FDIs (‘miniature replica’) operating at relatively low 
scales. The sacrifice of scale economies also has the implication that the value-adding activities 
of the affiliate to a large extent share inputs and the establishment of an internal price market is 
therefore unlikely simply because the activities are not technological separable (Williamson, 
1985), or expressed differently, the interface between various value-adding activities is 
substantial. Formally,  
 
H1: Cross border intra-firm sales of foreign affiliates have increased significantly more 
than cross border inter-firm sales.  
 
2.2 Host-home versus host-host affiliate sales  
As a second main effect of GVC specialization we would expect an increase of host-host sales 
relative to host-home. As we discussed above, the literatures in development economics and 
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international business provide strong theoretical arguments as to why one would expect a relative 
increase of value chain specialization spanning multiple countries and a relative decrease of 
affiliate sales between one home and one host country. Over the past twenty years we have 
observed a geographical, or spatial, dimension where the trend is that MNEs are moving away 
from a clear center-periphery (home-host) division of labor and towards a multi-center  
(differentiated) localization structure with a more sophisticated specialization. In our context the 
globalization trend infers less home-host (or rather, host-home) affiliate sales flows and more 
host-host sales. The interpretation is that non-home subsidiaries are moving up the value chain at 
the expense of the parent - simply because the MNEs to an increasing extent exercise a 'most-
efficient-location' strategy. Hence, 
 
H2a: Cross border host-host intra-firm sales of foreign affiliates have increased 
significantly more than cross border host-home intra-firm sales. 
 
The splitting-up of the MNE value chain and the subsequent (re)location decisions 
accelerated during the 1980es and – in particular – the 1990es (see e.g. Dicken, 2003). 
The time period coincides with the opening of many (developing) economies, such as the 
Chinese and Indian. To MNEs these emerging markets represented a new, attractive 
‘package’ of factor endowments that appeared as obvious, new location for 
manufacturing as well as service activities. These emerging markets would, to a large 
extent, challenge the MNE home country as the natural host for ‘centers of excellence’ 
and ‘world mandate’ production hubs. In the pursuit of factor cost differentials more and 
more affiliates in developing countries will assume status as division of labor hubs and, 
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consequently, more trade flows will be between affiliates outside the MNE home country. 
Hence, we expect the process of GVC to be especially strong for developing countries. 
Formally,  
  
H2b: Cross border host-host intra-firm sales of foreign affiliates in developing countries 
have increased significantly more than cross border host-home intra-firm sales. 
 
Figure 1 indicates the hypothesized change in affiliate trade patterns as a result of GVC 
specialization.  
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
3. Measuring and describing cross border sales of US foreign affiliates 
Data and sample 
We test our hypotheses using data on aggregate U.S. foreign affiliate sales to affiliated and 
unaffiliated parties in a large sample of host countries between 1983 and 2003. We obtained 
these aggregate affiliate sales data from the database US Direct Investment Abroad: Financial 
and Operating Data of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). For majority-owned non-
bank affiliates of non-bank U.S. parents, these data are broken down into sales to unaffiliated 
parties located in the focal host country, the U.S., and third countries, and into sales to affiliated 
parties located in these three categories of countries. We use this detailed subdivision of affiliate 
sales to distinguish between different types of foreign value-adding activities.  
We focus on the foreign sales of U.S. manufacturing firms for several reasons. First, U.S. 
foreign affiliate sales are the highest in the world (Brainard, 1997; WTO, 2005). Second, to the 
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best of our knowledge, the U.S. is the only country for which detailed data on the aggregate sales 
of its foreign affiliates is available on a yearly basis. And finally, the fact that we have data on 
U.S. multinationals fits the fact that the offshoring debate on non-market seeking FDI has 
especially been prominent on the agenda of policymakers and academics in the United States.  
Our sample is not balanced in the sense that for some countries and years certain types of 
sales are not known or not reported for reasons of confidentiality. The number of host countries 
included in our analyses is 56, but for most countries not all 21 years are covered. Obviously the 
numbers reported below are host- and home-country specific. They are home-country specific, 
because the U.S. is a large economy with a large home market, which differs from countries like 
the Netherlands or Denmark which are small open economies. As a consequence the relative 
shares of market seeking and (types of) non-market seeking FDI will differ accordingly. The data 
reported below are also host-country specific, because it is a number of host-country 
characteristics that is associated with certain types of FDI.  
 
Describing the pattern of affiliate cross border sales 
Figure 2 show the different affiliate cross border sales flows for which we have data. The flows 
can be organized along two key dimensions; host-home versus host-host, and intra-firm versus 
inter-firm.  
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
 
Based on the classification of affiliate sales flows in Figure 2, we have calculated the 
shares of these types in total cross border sales for the period 1983-2003. In calculating these 
shares, we have excluded the flow from subsidiary A to subsidiary B within the same host 
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country because it is unknown where the goods go to after value has been added in subsidiary B. 
This could both be back to the U.S. or to a third country, and to affiliated parties or unaffiliated 
parties, which makes classification impossible. Including this type of affiliate sales in total cross 
border sales when calculating the different shares does not affect our results and conclusion 
(results not shown but available upon request). The resulting shares are shown in Table 2a-2c. 
Because we expect that the amount of affiliate cross border sales has especially increased in 
countries with relatively cheap (labor) inputs, we distinguish between trade flows from affiliates 
in developed and developing countries.  
<Insert Table 2a about here> 
 
Table 2a shows the yearly shares of the different cross border sales types for the full 
sample (N=652). Table 2b and 2c do the same for developing host countries (N=270), 
respectively developed host countries (N=382). The dichotomous distinction between developed 
and developing is based on the value of GDP per capita in these countries, being either below the 
sample mean, or above the sample mean (which is 11,785 current U.S. dollars, PPP corrected). 
Of total cross border sales, about 28% is host-home sales and 72% concerns sales that go from 
one host country to another host country (time-averaged scores). The majority of the host-home 
sales concern intra-firm sales (24%) and only 4% is being transported back from the host to 
unaffiliated customers in the United States. The cross border sales that concern multiple host 
countries are almost equally distributed between intra- and inter-firm sales: The share of host-
host inter-firm sales is 34% and the share of its intra-firm equivalent is 38%. Not taking the 
country characteristics into account, we have tested for each type of cross border sales (and their 
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respective sums) if the average score in the first five years (1983-1988) differs significantly from 
the average score in the last five years (1999-2003). 
In line with our theoretical expectation (hypothesis 1), the affiliate trade flow structure 
has changed in the direction of a higher share of intra-firm sales relative to inter-firm. The 
descriptive data in Table 2a show that total intra-firm sales have increased from 59.8% between 
1983-1988 to 63.4% in the 1999-2003 period (|t| = 1.96, p<.05).  
Furthermore, and without discussing all countries in detail2, hypotheses 2a and 2b predict 
a change over time in the types of cross border sales from ‘simple’ host-home sales to those 
investments associated with the process of GVC specialization, i.e. host-host, and specifically its 
intra-firm component. The descriptive data in Table 2a tell us that the structure of cross border 
sales has indeed changed over time, with a decrease from host-home sales from 29.4% in the 5-
year period 1983-1988 to 26.3% in the 5-year period 1999-2003. In line with our theoretical 
                                                 
2 Underneath these general characteristics, substantial country-level deviations exist. For example, for Mexico as a 
country close to the United States and with relatively low wages compared to the U.S., we may expect that 
especially the share of host-home sales will be relatively high. This may be for both intra-firm (from subsidiary to 
parent) and arm’s length (from Mexico direct sales to U.S. customers) sales. The data show that especially the intra-
firm host-home sales are the bulk of the total U.S. affiliate sales in Mexico. The time-averaged share is 71% which 
is far above the average of host-home sales, followed by host-host intra-firm sales (11%), and inter firm sales (both 
host-home and host-host 4%). Canada, which is much closer to the United States in terms of consumer preferences 
and level of economic development, is also dominated by host-home sales. As expected, the share of sales directly 
aimed at U.S. customers is far above average, i.e. 14% host-home inter-firm versus the overall average of 4% for all 
countries. Nevertheless, the bulk of the U.S. affiliate sales in Canada is intra-firm (71%), i.e. from Canada back to 
U.S. parents. The Netherlands, a country with a high level of economic development, approximately equal 
production costs compared to the U.S. (at least higher than Mexico), but located at a large distance from the U.S. has 
a correspondingly low share of host-home sales. Both types of host-home sales are far below average with 4% going 
from the Netherlands back to U.S. MNEs and 0.9% to the U.S. customers. However, given its central location in 
Europe and the barriers to export from the U.S. to European countries because of EU trade barriers, its share of host-
host inter-firm sales is about 10 percentage points higher than the average of 34% (export platform). The same holds 
for host-host intra-firm sales (global sourcing). 
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expectation, host-host intra-firm sales have increased (from 34.4% between 1983-1988 to 41% in 
the 1999-2003 period). Just like the cross-sectional scores, individual country scores may be 
more or less pronounced. For example, Mexico has increased its share of host-home inter-firm 
sales from below average to above average after joining NAFTA (effective January 1994). On 
the other hand, intra-firm host-home sales (i.e. sales from affiliates in Mexico to the US parent) 
have decreased after NAFTA. This is probably because NAFTA allows U.S. MNEs to serve the 
U.S. home market directly instead of using intra-firm transactions.  
Unpaired t-tests between the shares in the first and the last period indicate that significant 
differences exist for the share of host-host sales in the total sample, both for inter firm host-host 
(|t| = 1.876, p<.10) and intra-firm host-host (|t| = 2.969, p<.01). Only the latter result is robust for 
excluding 1983 observations. In this case we find that the share of intra-firm host-host sales is 
significantly higher in the latter period than in the first period, which is in line with hypothesis 
2a.  
<Insert Table 2b and 2c about here> 
 
Table 2b and Table 2c show the scores of the different shares between 1983 and 2003 for 
the set of developing and developed countries. Distinguishing between developing (Table 2b) 
and developed countries (Table 2c) show differences between the first and the last period are 
especially significant in developing countries: host-home sales are significantly lower in the 
1999-2003 period than in the period 1983-1988 in developing countries (|t| = 1.784, p<.10). In 
line with hypothesis 2b for affiliate sales from developing countries we find that the host-home 
intra-firm sales that has decreased (|t| = 1.79, p<.10) while the host-host intra-firm sales has 
increased significantly in the latter period (|t| = 2.969, p<.01). These differences are even more 
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pronounced when 1983 is excluded. For the set of developed countries we find no such pattern 
when comparing the 1983-1988 period with the 1999-2003 period. Other than an apparent 
increase in total intra-firm sales (|t|=2.15, p<.05), supporting hypothesis 1, we obtain no robust 
significant differences when comparing the two periods of observation. This finding is however 
not reflected in significant differences on the scores of the two components (host-home and host-
host), suggesting this result is not robust. 
These descriptive statistics largely support our hypotheses 1, 2a and 2b, but to formally 
test if significant shifts in the pattern of cross border sales can be observed we relate the three 
different shares (and their respective sums) to a time-trend variable while controlling for a broad 
range of host country characteristics.  
 
4. Testing the changing pattern of cross border sales 
The set up of our regression equation is derived from traditional gravity equations in 
international economics (e.g., Tinbergen, 1962; Linnemann, 1966; Geraci and Prewo, 1977; 
Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Rose, 2004; Huang, 2007). Such 
models have been shown to have clear theoretical foundations (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 
1985) and have produced some of the clearest and most robust empirical results in international 
economics (Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995; for an overview, see Frankel, 1997). They postulate 
that merchandise trade flows between countries depend on several characteristics of these 
countries (Bergstrand, 1985; Brainard, 1997). These factors include transportation costs, 
typically proxied by the presence or absence of a shared land border and by geographic distance, 
and formal trade barriers, often proxied by the presence or absence of free trade agreements. 
Although originally used to explain export flows, gravity models have also been used 
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successfully to explain FDI flows, foreign affiliate sales, and the share of exports and affiliate 
sales in total foreign sales (Brainard, 1997; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; Braconier et al., 2005; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). 
 
Dependent variables 
We use the four dependent variables reflecting the different cross border sales flows as 
distinguished in Figure 2. In addition to these four, we also include the sum of intra- and inter 
firm host-home sales (total host-home) and the sum of intra-firm home host and intra-firm host-
host (total intra-firm). All these sales flows are calculated in terms of their share in total cross 
border sales. In sum: 
i) Total of host-home sales. Given the fact that total of host-home is equal to 100% 
minus the total of host-host, the results for host-host are mirrored in the host-home 
results. Coefficients are the same, but signs are opposite. 
ii) Total of intra-firm sales. For reasons explained above, the results for the total inter-
firm sales are opposite to the results for total intra-firm sales. 
iii) Host-home intra-firm sales; 
iv) Host-home inter-firm sales; 
v) Host-host inter-firm sales; 
vi) Host-host intra-firm sales;  
If our thesis on a trend towards a GVC specialization is correct, we would observe a significant 
decrease of the host-home sales (especially the intra-firm host-home) compared to the intra-firm 
host-host sales over time (Hypothesis 2a and 2b). We complement our set of dependent variables 
with data on our independent variables, resulting in a panel of 56 countries and 21 years (see 
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Appendix A for a list of these countries). Due to missing observations for some years, our final 
dataset consists of 652 observations. Because we control for first order autocorrelation (AR1), 
and heteroskedasticity our regressions are based on a feasible generalized least squares (GLS) 
method. 
 
Independent variables 
Time trend: To capture the changing pattern over time, we include a time-trend measuring the 
number of years since t=1983. We expect a negative coefficient for the time trend variable when 
explaining host-home sales (hence a positive for host-host) and we hypothesized a positive 
coefficient for the variable measuring intra-firm cross border sales. 
Level of economic development: We include the log of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita to control for differences in level of economic development. GDP per capita is measured 
in current U.S. dollars and corrected for purchasing power parities. These data are taken from the 
World Development Indicators.  
Time trend x GDP per capita interaction: We include an interaction effect between the time-
trend and GDP per capita for two reasons; (i) because we are looking at cross border sales and it 
is especially local sales (market seeking FDI) that goes to developed countries and cross border 
sales (non-market seeking) that goes to developing countries, we expect that the time trend 
differs for developed and developing countries and we control for this by this interaction effect. 
The presence of such an effect is also reflected in the different results in developed and 
developing countries of the t-tests as discussed earlier; (ii) related to the previous empirical 
argument, we theorized that the process of global value chain specialization especially occurs in 
developing countries and not in developed countries. The interaction effect is included to 
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explicitly test this moderating effect of level of economic development as formally hypothesized 
in hypothesis 1b and 2b. We expect to find a negative interaction effect in the regression 
explaining intra-firm cross border sales (Hypothesis 1b) and a positive interaction effect in the 
regression explaining the share of host-home sales (hypothesis 2b). In addition to the above 
variables we control for a number of other host country characteristics typically included in 
gravity type models. 
 
Control variables 
Geographic distance: As is commonly done in gravity equations, we control for geographic 
distance between the U.S. and each host country by including the log of the great-circle 
geographic distance (in kilometers) between our 56 country pairs (e.g. Grosse and Trevino, 1996; 
Bevan et al., 2004; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). Data were obtained from the distance calculator of 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Geographic distance is expected to have a negative effect on 
the share of host-home sales, since increasing geographic distance is associated with higher 
transportation costs making it less attractive to produce abroad and export back to the U.S. 
(Frankel, 1997). For a similar reason we expect a positive effect of geographic distance on the 
share of host-host intra-firm sales, because with a low geographic distance between the U.S. and 
host country A, the question arises why one would not directly serve the subsidiary in host 
country B from the U.S. instead of through host country A (ceteris paribus). In other words, we 
associate an increase in host-host intra firm sales with increasing levels of geographic distance.  
Shared border: As is commonly done in international economics (Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995; 
Frankel, 1997), we include a dummy coded 1 if the host country has a shared border with the 
U.S. Note that this shared border variable also measures NAFTA membership (or its predecessor 
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CUSFTA), because Canada is NAFTA member as of 1989 and Mexico as of 1994. We expect a 
positive relationship between the shared border dummy and the share of host-home sales because 
of the low transportation costs. For reasons explained above, we expect a negative relationship 
between shared border dummy and the host-host intra-firm sales. 
Openness: Following Kumar (1994) and Habib and Zurawicki (2002), among others, we control 
for the openness of each host country through the sum of its worldwide merchandise imports and 
exports as a percentage of its GDP. This percentage was obtained from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI). We expect a positive relationship between openness and our dependent 
variables as all cross border sales types entail exports, either from the host country to the U.S. or 
from a host country to a third country. 
GATT/WTO: We include a 0-1 dummy variable indicating whether a specific host country was 
a member of the World Trade Organization (or its predecessor, GATT) in a given year. We 
expect a positive effect of GATT/WTO membership for all our dependent variables. 
Fixed effects: Finally, we control for both country- and year-specific effects by including 
country dummies (default is Mexico) and year dummies (default is 1983). The country dummies 
measure all omitted country level factors (e.g. institutional and cultural factors) not accounted for 
by the independent variables, and the year dummies measure the year specific deviation from the 
time-trend.  
 
 Results 
The correlation matrix displayed in Table 3 shows that the correlations between our independent 
variables are relatively low. Geographic distance is correlated -.60 with the shared border 
dummy, which is logical given their natural interrelationship. Openness is moderately correlated 
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with GDP per capita at .25, and with the time trend (.15) a finding that is in line with the process 
of globalization. Other than these logical correlations, all correlations are below .15. 
 
<Insert Table 3 about here > 
 
Estimating our different regression equations we obtain 6 models as presented in Table 4. 
All models fit the data well, as their Chi-squared values are all significant (P<0.001).  
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
No significant time-trend effects are found when explaining total intra-firm sales. The 
time-trend variable is insignificant when explaining inter-firm sales, providing no support for 
hypothesis 1.  
Now turning to the second set of hypotheses, 2a and 2b, we find a negative relationship 
between time-trend and the share of host-home sales, confirming that over time the share of this 
type of cross border sales has decreased. However, we also find a positive interaction effect, 
implying that the negative time-trend effect is moderated by level of economic development 
supporting hypothesis 2b. The negative main effect and the positive interaction effect also hold 
when explaining the share of intra-firm host-home sales. For the share of intra-firm host-host 
sales we find opposite results, i.e. we find a positive time-trend effect and a negative interaction 
effect, implying that over time the GVC specialization has increased, but that this positive trend 
differs between countries with different levels of economic development, indeed supporting 
hypothesis 2a and 2b. These findings suggest that total intra-firm sales have not increased, but 
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the underlying structure of intra-firm sales has, that is, host-home intra-firm sales have decreased 
and the more ‘advanced’ host-host intra-firm sales have increased. 
Given the significant interaction effects, we further explore the exact nature of this 
moderating effect of GDP per capita on the time-trend. Defining developing countries as the 
mean value of GDP per capita minus one standard deviation (=8.6 in log values) and developed 
countries as mean plus one standard deviation (=10.16), and keeping all other factors constant we 
plot the interaction effects of the time-trend and GDP per capita in Figure 3a and Figure 3b. 
 
<Insert Figure 3a and 3b here> 
 
The dotted line reflects the relationship between the time-trend and the share of host-
home sales, respectively the share of host-host intra-firm sales for developed countries. The 
smoothed line plots the development of these sales shares for developing countries. In 
calculating the equations we assume that all variables except for the time-trend, GDP per capita 
(in log) and their interaction are constant. This implies that the estimated coefficients of the 
interaction effects and the main time-trend effect determine the slope of the curve while the 
starting value at the y-axis is determined by the estimated coefficient of (log) GDP per capita. 
We obtain two figures, both showing the development of the two sales shares between 1983 and 
2003, keeping all other factors constant. Figure 3a clearly shows that the share of host-home 
sales has decreased for both developed and developing countries, but that the slope of the 
developing countries sub-sample is steeper, implying that the decrease of host-home sales 
especially holds for developing countries. On the other hand, Figure 3b shows that the share of 
host-host intra-firm sales has increased substantially for developing countries. We find a small 
 24
negative slope – almost a horizontal curve – for the share of host-host intra-firm in developed 
countries, a result in line with the non-significant differences of our t-test between the 1983-1988 
and the 1999-2003 period. All in all, the results suggest that the share of host-home sales has 
decreased, and the share of host-host intra-firm sales has increased over time, confirming our 
hypothesis that a shift towards GVC specialization can be observed, at least for U.S. affiliates. 
This result especially holds for the change from host-home intra-firm to host-host intra-firm 
sales. 
Our other independent (control) variables mostly behave according to our expectations. 
As expected, we find a significantly negative effect of geographic distance in the models 
explaining the share of host-home sales and a significantly positive effect of geographic distance 
in the models explaining the share of host-host intra-firm sales. Along similar lines we obtain a 
significantly positive effect for the share of host-home sales in those host countries sharing a 
border with the United States. And again we find the opposite relationship for the share of host-
host intra-firm sales. We find a non-significant effect for host countries that are member of 
GATT/WTO, and mixed findings are obtained for openness. 
In order to check if the changing pattern in type of cross border sales is caused by a 
decrease in absolute host-home sales and an increase in absolute intra-firm sales in multiple 
countries, we have also regressed our set of independent variables on the absolute levels of sales 
of both host-home sales and the host-host sales (results not shown but available upon request). 
We find for both types of sales that our time-trend variable is positive and significant, suggesting 
that both types of sales have increased in absolute terms (both p<.01). Given our earlier results 
on their respective shares, the estimated coefficient for home host sales is logically smaller than 
for the host-host sales (.15 versus .28). We also find a significant negative interaction effect for 
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both types of sales, confirming our previous findings on the shares of these types of sales in total 
cross border sales. This negative interaction effect for the absolute sales implies that the increase 
over time especially holds for developing countries. In other words both types of sales have 
increased, but the host-home sales relatively less, leading to a pattern of cross border sales that is 
increasingly globally specialized. 
 
Robustness analysis 
We explore the robustness of our findings by including institutional quality and wage costs of 
low skilled workers as additional control variables. Because of the results of our descriptive 
analyses and associated t-tests we also exclude the 1983 observations to see if our results hold. 
We include institutional quality as an additional control because if the time-trend variable picks 
up a general improvement of institutions over time (a phenomenon that may especially hold for 
developing countries), the positive effect of the time-trend variable should not be attributed to 
time, but to improvements in institutional quality. We measure institutional quality by the 
frequently used International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)3. This ICRG measure is an aggregate 
composite measure of 22 components all proxying different aspects of the degree of well-
functioning of institutions. Note that the ICRG measure refers to the ‘first’ host, i.e. host country 
1 in Figure 2. Its correlation with the time-trend variable is .27. Including the ICRG variable in 
our regressions does not affect our conclusion regarding the time-trend effect. The results are 
shown in Table 5.  
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
                                                 
3 For more details on the underlying items and methodology we refer to: http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx 
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The time-trend and its associated interaction with GDP per capita remain significant with a 
negative main effect on host-home (intra-firm) affiliate sales and a positive main effect on host-
host intra-firm sales. The interaction effects are the opposite and confirm our previous findings. 
Interestingly, controlling for institutional quality yields a significant positive effect of the ICRG 
measure when explaining host-host inter-firm sales. In contrast with the main results reported 
earlier, the time-trend variable is significantly negative (insignificant in the main results) and the 
interaction effect between time-trend and GDP per capita is significantly positive. This suggests 
that over time, the share of host-host inter-firm sales has decreased, especially in developing 
countries, but that countries with higher levels of institutional quality do attract more of this type 
of cross border sales. In other words, unless developing countries have not been able to improve 
their institutional quality they will have experienced a reduction of U.S. affiliates exporting 
goods to customers in third countries from their soil. 
  
We furthermore conducted a test including the wage costs of low skilled workers as an additional 
control. Because our focus is on non-market seeking U.S. outward FDI, we expect that countries 
with relatively low levels of labor costs, especially of low skilled labor, attract more sales. 
Following Braconier et al. (2005) we use data on wage costs from the Union Bank of 
Switzerland (UBS, various issues).4 Including the wage costs of low skilled workers does not 
affect our main results. The time-trend variable remains significantly negative for (intra-firm) 
host-home cross border sales, and its interaction with GDP per capita positive. Moreover, the 
                                                 
4 About every three years, UBS reports annual gross wages of particular professions. Wage costs are operationalized 
as the hourly pre-tax income of industrial workers (toolmaker) of an, on average, 35-year old worker with three 
years of vocational training and at least 10 years of practical experience in a large company of the metalworking 
industry. 
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time-trend variable is positive for host-host intra-firm sales and the interaction between time-
trend and GDP per capita is negative and significant, again supporting hypothesis 2a and 2b.  
5. Conclusions and discussion of limitations  
In this study we have taken issue with the presumed trend towards global value chain (GVC) 
specialization - the GVC specialization thesis - and tested if it can be empirically supported. In 
the absence of large-scale activity-level measures we looked at the various flows among foreign 
affiliates as an alternative indicator of GVC specialization. Our study builds on the underlying 
logic that more specialization - that is a more advanced division of labor - among physically 
disparate MNE units almost inevitably infers more flows of goods, services, information, and 
people among the MNE affiliates. More specifically, we have theorized on both the 
organizational and geographical dimension of the GVC specialization thesis and meticulously 
distinguished between types of cross border sales flows. Using a sample of US MNEs in the 
1983-2003 period we have carefully tested the trends for the different components that make up 
total cross border affiliate sales. To our knowledge, we are the first to provide such a careful 
aggregate analysis of MNE behavior over such a long period.  
We contribute to the vast literature on globalization and GVC specialization by showing 
that against the background of a relatively stable share of cross border US affiliate sales (versus 
local sales) over the last two decades the share of host-home sales has decreased and the share of 
host-host sales has increased over time - especially for developing countries. This latter 
phenomenon holds especially for intra-firm sales, suggesting that the structure of cross border 
affiliate sales has changed in the direction of more host-host intra-firm sales.  
The above findings are important because they also inform the sometimes heated policy 
debate on globalization by providing empirical regularities and hence, a more balanced point of 
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view. Our US MNE data confirm that the share of cross border affiliate sales has not changed 
significantly, but the underlying structure of the cross border trade flows has. Having said so, we 
need to recognize at the same time that we have only studied aggregate numbers and more fine-
grained information on the nature of the activities involved is required to fully evaluate these 
developments. Ideally, we would like to have data allowing us to combine the organizational and 
geographical dimension with the functional (value activity) dimension. This is also important 
against the background of the offshoring discussion, in which it has frequently been argued that 
new forms of offshoring have emerged (McKinsey Global Institute, 2007; Farell, 2004, 2006; 
Engardio et al. 2003; Mudambi, 2008). The trade flow effects (‘affiliate sales’) are forwarded as 
indicators, or proxies, of GVC specialization in the realization that direct, activity-level 
measurements of MNE GVC configuration involve extreme data requirements beyond the scope 
of our capacity. The measurement of affiliate sales flows seems an acceptable second-best testing 
ground of the GVC specialization assertion. However, these sales data are not perfect. Some 
affiliate sales in a given year may represent production, and hence economic activity, from 
earlier years (BEA, 2004: M-19). Moreover, MNEs sometimes artificially increase or decrease 
the sales or value added by their affiliates by manipulating the transfer prices that these affiliates 
paid for inputs purchased from affiliated parties (Dunning, 1993: 506; Eden et al., 2005). The 
scale of such manipulation should have decreased in the 1990es, owing to the introduction of 
OECD regulation prescribing the use of transfer prices that conform to the arm’s length standard. 
As a result, the sales data used in this study are likely to have represented the amount of US 
MNE activity abroad reasonably well over a large part of the 1983-2003 time period studied. An 
obvious limitation of our analysis concerns the use of cross border sales of US MNEs, limiting 
the possibility for a broader generalization of our findings. As we described in our model setup, 
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similar fine-grained aggregate data for other countries do not exist, or is not made publicly 
available. Acknowledging this limitation, the fact that the US is the largest economy in the world 
and that US MNEs are generally considered to be on the forefront of the globalization trend, we 
have no reason to question the generalizability of our findings.  
In conclusion, we have shown – using fine-grained aggregate data on cross border sales 
of US foreign affiliates – that the trend towards GVC specialization is reflected in the increase of 
the share of host-host intra firm sales, which especially holds for developing countries. This is 
important because it sheds new light on the underlying structure of GVC specialization of 
MNEs. 
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Figure 1: Hypothesized effects of GVC specialization on affiliate sales flows 
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Figure 2: Categorizing cross border U.S. affiliate sales 
 
 
 
A = Host-home intra-firm affiliate sales 
 
B = Host-home inter-firm affiliate sales 
 
C = Host-host inter-firm affiliate sales 
 
D = Host-host intra-firm affiliate sales 
 
 
Note that all flows are calculated as shares of the total cross border sales (A+B+C+D). 
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Figure 3a: time trend effect and share of host-home sales 
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Figure 3b: time trend effect and share of host-host intra-firm sales (global value chain 
specialization) 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the local sales versus cross border sales as a share of total MNE sales 
 Total sample Developing countries (GDP per 
capita below sample mean) 
Developed countries (GDP per 
capita above sample mean) 
Year Local sales Cross border 
sales 
Local sales Cross border 
sales 
Local sales Cross border 
sales 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
 
0.659
0.632
0.605
0.615
0.627
0.599
0.617
0.615
0.604
0.626
0.583
0.641
0.642
0.604
0.63
0.62
0.585
0.61
0.617
0.614
0.623
0.341
0.368
0.395
0.385
0.373
0.401
0.383
0.385
0.396
0.374
0.417
0.359
0.358
0.396
0.37
0.38
0.415
0.39
0.383
0.386
0.377
0.724 
0.73 
0.688 
0.674 
0.686 
0.741 
0.707 
0.69 
0.653 
0.698 
0.58 
0.63 
0.682 
0.632 
0.699 
0.66 
0.601 
0.697 
0.685 
0.709 
0.696 
 
0.276
0.27
0.312
0.326
0.314
0.259
0.293
0.31
0.347
0.302
0.42
0.37
0.318
0.368
0.301
0.34
0.399
0.303
0.315
0.291
0.304
0.605
0.548
0.523
0.561
0.581
0.512
0.578
0.565
0.567
0.589
0.585
0.651
0.609
0.584
0.587
0.596
0.579
0.571
0.573
0.53
0.58
0.395
0.452
0.477
0.439
0.419
0.488
0.422
0.435
0.433
0.411
0.415
0.349
0.391
0.416
0.413
0.404
0.421
0.429
0.427
0.47
0.42
Average .617 .382 .679 .321 .575 .425 
Average 1st five years .628 .372 .700 .300 .564 .436 
Average last five years .609 .390 .678 .322 .566 .434 
Absolute t-value of equality of means 
test 1st five years=last five years 
0.0187 0.0187 0.2881 0.2881 0.77 0.77 
Absolute t-value of equality of means 
(excluding 1983) 
0.4913 0.4913 0.1592 0.1592 1.1274 1.1274 
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Table 2a: Descriptive statistics of the four main types of cross border sales flows as a share of total cross border sales (total 
sample) 
Year Total host-
home (A+B) 
Total intra-firm 
(A+D) 
Host-home intra-
firm (A) 
Host-home inter-
firm (B) 
Host-host inter-
firm (C) 
Host-host intra-
firm (D) 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
 
0.24
0.29
0.31
0.32
0.31
0.32
0.33
0.312
0.283
0.223
0.275
0.303
0.251
0.264
0.265
0.269
0.273
0.284
0.235
0.278
0.247
0.6
0.62
0.57
0.6
0.6
0.54
0.597
0.626
0.642
0.579
0.622
0.638
0.621
0.625
0.61
0.625
0.661
0.634
0.582
0.664
0.628
0.21 
0.26 
0.26 
0.28 
0.26 
0.25 
0.27 
0.258 
0.235 
0.184 
0.234 
0.272 
0.211 
0.227 
0.226 
0.236 
0.242 
0.235 
0.191 
0.241 
0.208 
0.04
0.03
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.069
0.056
0.054
0.047
0.038
0.041
0.031
0.041
0.037
0.039
0.033
0.031
0.048
0.043
0.037
0.039
0.37
0.34
0.37
0.36
0.34
0.38
0.337
0.319
0.309
0.381
0.337
0.329
0.338
0.337
0.349
0.34
0.307
0.312
0.373
0.297
0.333
0.39
0.36
0.31
0.32
0.34
0.29
0.327
0.368
0.407
0.395
0.388
0.366
0.41
0.398
0.384
0.389
0.419
0.399
0.391
0.423
0.42
Average .28 .62 .24 .04 .34 .38 
Average 1st five years .294 .598 .254 .042 .356 .344 
Average last five years .263 .634 .223 .0396 .324 .410 
Absolute t-value of equality of means 
test 1st five years=last five years 
1.06 1.96** .953 .678 1.876* 2.969*** 
Absolute t-value of equality of means 
(excluding 1983) 
2.29** 1.42 1.469 .449 1.364 3.026*** 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.10 (two-tailed). The t-test is performed on all yearly observations and is unpaired because of the missing observations for some 
years. Equal variances are assumed. 
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Table 2b: Descriptive statistics of the four main types of cross border sales flows as a share of total cross border sales for 
developing countries (GDP per capita below sample mean) 
Year Total host-
home (A+B) 
Total intra-firm 
(A+D) 
Host-home intra-
firm (A) 
Host-home inter-
firm (B) 
Host-host inter-
firm (C) 
Host-host intra-
firm (D) 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
 
0.302
0.366
0.415
0.419
0.428
0.395
0.386
0.385
0.367
0.261
0.369
0.424
0.306
0.397
0.388
0.411
0.399
0.335
0.259
0.319
0.318
0.584
0.645
0.573
0.636
0.677
0.538
0.571
0.592
0.681
0.603
0.652
0.673
0.588
0.668
0.613
0.641
0.708
0.643
0.599
0.716
0.67
0.245 
0.322 
0.34 
0.372 
0.38 
0.286 
0.303 
0.311 
0.31 
0.222 
0.319 
0.387 
0.255 
0.347 
0.337 
0.363 
0.362 
0.252 
0.206 
0.277 
0.267 
0.058
0.043
0.067
0.047
0.048
0.109
0.082
0.073
0.056
0.038
0.051
0.037
0.05
0.049
0.051
0.047
0.036
0.082
0.053
0.041
0.051
0.357
0.31
0.351
0.315
0.274
0.351
0.344
0.333
0.261
0.356
0.296
0.288
0.361
0.281
0.335
0.311
0.253
0.273
0.347
0.241
0.278
0.339
0.323
0.233
0.264
0.297
0.252
0.268
0.281
0.371
0.381
0.333
0.286
0.333
0.321
0.276
0.278
0.346
0.391
0.393
0.439
0.403
Average .36 .63 .31 .055 .31 .32 
Average 1st five years .386 .623 .332 .053 .32 .29 
Average last five years .326 .667 .272 .053 .278 .39 
Absolute t-value of equality of means 
test 1st five years=last five years 
1.784* .963 1.79* .01 1.09 2.969*** 
Absolute t-value of equality of means 
(excluding 1983) 
2.294** .566 2.31** .053 .61 3.158*** 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.10 (two-tailed). The t-test is performed on all yearly observations and is unpaired because of the missing observations for some 
years. Equal variances are assumed.
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Table 2c: Descriptive statistics of the four main types of cross border sales flows as a share of total cross border sales for 
developed countries (GDP per capita above sample mean) 
Year Total host-
home (A+B) 
Total intra-firm 
(A+D) 
Host-home intra-
firm (A) 
Host-home inter-
firm (B) 
Host-host inter-
firm (C) 
Host-host intra-
firm (D) 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
 
0.199
0.241
0.21
0.236
0.214
0.275
0.312
0.263
0.218
0.204
0.199
0.195
0.206
0.167
0.182
0.184
0.224
0.259
0.219
0.242
0.205
0.596
0.606
0.566
0.561
0.562
0.551
0.62
0.648
0.602
0.567
0.598
0.606
0.648
0.594
0.608
0.615
0.644
0.63
0.57
0.618
0.604
0.171 
0.214 
0.174 
0.191 
0.173 
0.23 
0.267 
0.222 
0.167 
0.165 
0.167 
0.168 
0.173 
0.139 
0.15 
0.159 
0.196 
0.227 
0.182 
0.208 
0.173 
0.027
0.027
0.036
0.045
0.042
0.045
0.045
0.041
0.041
0.038
0.033
0.03
0.032
0.027
0.031
0.024
0.028
0.031
0.036
0.033
0.031
0.375
0.367
0.397
0.393
0.396
0.402
0.334
0.311
0.345
0.393
0.369
0.366
0.319
0.378
0.36
0.359
0.327
0.337
0.392
0.348
0.364
0.425
0.392
0.392
0.37
0.389
0.321
0.353
0.426
0.435
0.402
0.431
0.438
0.475
0.455
0.458
0.456
0.448
0.403
0.388
0.41
0.431
Average .22 .60 .18 .034 .36 .41 
Average 1st five years .22 .578 .18 .035 .385 .39 
Average last five years .23 .613 .20 .032 .354 .41 
Absolute t-value of equality of means 
test 1st five years=last five years 
.478 2.15** .70 .943 1.934* 1.11 
Absolute t-value of equality of means 
(excluding 1983) 
.078 1.759* .287 1.064 1.509 1.197 
 *** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.10 (two-tailed). The t-test is performed on all yearly observations and is unpaired because of the missing observations for some 
years. Equal variances are assumed. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the regression analysis 
 Mean St. 
dev. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Total Host-home FDI 28.0 23.9 1           
2. Total Intra-firm FDI 61.5 21.3 .38 1          
3. Host-home Intra-firm FDI 23.8 22.3 .97 .50 1         
4. Host-home inter-firm FDI 4.3 6.0 .38 -.33 .14 1        
5. Host-host inter-firm FDI 34.1 20.1 -.51 -.95 -.57 .06 1       
6. Host-host intra-firm FDI 37.8 22.0 -.61 .47 -.54 -.47 -.36 1      
7. Time-trend 11.33 6.04 -.07 .07 -.06 -.06 -.05 .12 1     
8. GDP per capita (log) 9.37 .792 -.30 -.10 -.29 -.14 .14 .20 .13 1    
9. Geographic distance (log) 8.83 .656 -.32 -.10 -.26 -.28 .18 .18 -.03 -.09 1   
10. Openness (log) 3.92 .67 .05 .03 .07 -.08 -.00 -.05 .15 .25 .05 1  
11. Shared border/Nafta dummy .05 .22 .56 .23 .54 .26 -.32 -.33 -.00 .09 -.60 -.01 1 
12. GATT/WTO dummy .94 .24 -.11 .10 -.09 -.10 -.07 .19 .08 .14 .08 -.01 .03 
 
 
 47
Table 4: Explaining shares of types of cross border sales flows in total cross border flows; main results  
Variable 
The capital letter in each heading refers to the sales flow depicted in Figure 3 
Host-home 
 
(A+B) 
Intra-firm 
 
(A+D) 
Host-home 
intra-firm 
(A) 
Host-home, 
inter-firm 
(B) 
Host-host 
inter-firm 
(C) 
Host-host 
intra-firm 
(D) 
Time trend -.038 
(.008) 
*** .005 
(.008) 
 -.025 
(.006) 
*** .000 
(.002) 
 -.002 
(.005) 
 .018 
(.009) 
** 
Interaction effect  
(Time trend*log GDP per 
capita) 
.004 
(.001) 
*** -.001 
(.001) 
 .002 
(.0006) 
*** .000 
(.000) 
 .000 
(.000) 
 -.002 
(.001) 
* 
GDP per capita (log) .07 
(.025) 
*** .073 
(.023) 
** .0499 
(.022) 
** .006 
(.007) 
 -.04 
(.026) 
 -.019 
(.029) 
 
Geographic distance (log) -.098  
(.029) 
*** .266 
(.037) 
*** -.066 
(.028) 
** -060 
(.018) 
*** -.184 
(.038) 
*** .31 
(.025) 
*** 
Openness .037 
(.017) 
** .013 
(.019) 
 .013 
(.013) 
 -.000 
(.005) 
 .001 
(.01) 
 -.007 
(.018) 
 
Shared border dummy .63 
(.04) 
*** .42 
(.04) 
*** .64 
(.044) 
*** -.03 
(.02) 
 -.37 
(.038) 
*** -.24 
(.04) 
*** 
GATT/WTO dummy .009 
(.027) 
 -.03 
(.019) 
 -.004 
(.023) 
 .007 
(.007) 
 .015 
(.016) 
 .001 
(.02) 
 
             
N 652  652  652  652  652  652  
χ2 12250 *** 19751 *** 12523 *** 2735 *** 18760 *** 7847 *** 
Log likelihood 1023.17  931.61  1098.1  1770.1  974.6  867.9  
             
a Country and year dummies and intercept are not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.10 (two-tailed). 
Notes:  
- The different cross border sales types are calculated as shares in total cross border sales. 
- Given that Host-home is equal to 100% minus Host-Host, the estimated coefficients are equal, but the signs are reversed. Therefore we do not estimate Host-
Host separately. For similar reasons we only show the results of total intra firm FDI (equal to flow A+D in Figure 1) because the share of Inter-firm flows is 
equal to 100% minus the share of total intra firm flows. 
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Table 5: Additional control: institutional quality (International Country Risk Guide score of the 1st host) 
Variable 
The capital letter in each heading refers to the sales flow depicted in Figure 3 
Host-home 
 
(A+B) 
Intra-firm 
 
(A+D) 
Host-home 
intra-firm 
(A) 
Host-home, 
inter-firm 
(B) 
Host-host 
inter-firm 
(C) 
Host-host 
intra-firm 
(D) 
Time trend -.046 
(.01) 
*** .004 
(.01) 
 -.034 
(.008) 
*** .001 
(.003) 
 -.019 
(.007) 
*** .030 
(.011) 
*** 
Interaction effect  
(Time trend*log GDP per 
capita) 
.004 
(.001) 
*** -.0006 
(.001) 
 .003 
(.0008) 
*** -.0000 
(.0002) 
 .002 
(.0007) 
*** -.003 
(.001) 
*** 
GDP per capita (log) .063 
(.028) 
** .067 
(.035) 
* .032 
(.025) 
 .009 
(.008) 
 -.087 
(.029) 
*** -.012 
(.031) 
 
Geographic distance (log) .059 
(.033) 
* .402 
(.038) 
*** .039 
(.029) 
 -.006 
(.009) 
 -.365 
(.038) 
*** .314 
(.031) 
*** 
Openness .028 
(.018) 
 -.003 
(.02) 
 -.001 
(.01) 
 -.002 
(.006) 
 .014 
(.017) 
 -.038 
(.024) 
 
Shared border dummy .811 
(.041) 
*** .569 
(.038) 
*** .781 
(.037) 
*** .023 
(.014) 
* -.589 
(.036) 
*** -.233 
(.034) 
*** 
GATT/WTO dummy .012 
(.02) 
 -.028 
(.02) 
 .003 
(.023) 
 .008 
(.009) 
 .011 
(.019) 
 -.0011 
(.02) 
 
Institutional quality (ICRG) .0008 
(.0005) 
 .0000 
(.0000) 
 .0000 
(.0000) 
 -.0000 
(.0002) 
 .0019 
(.0005) 
*** -.0008 
(.0009) 
 
N 571  571  571  571  571  571  
χ2 12729 *** 17048 *** 11659 *** 2689 *** 22981 *** 9536 *** 
Log likelihood 903.6  820.4  966.6  1527.8  866.8  755.4  
             
a Country and year dummies and intercept are not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.10 (two-tailed). 
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 Appendix A: List of countries included in the analysis  
 
Argentina Israel 
Australia Italy 
Austria Jamaica 
Bahamas Japan 
Barbados Malaysia 
Belgium Mexico 
Bermuda Netherlands 
Brazil New Zealand 
Canada Nigeria 
Chile Norway 
China Panama 
Colombia Peru 
Costa Rica Philippines 
Czech Republic Poland 
Dominican Republic Portugal 
Ecuador Russia 
Egypt Saudi Arabia 
Finland Singapore 
France South Africa 
Germany South Korea 
Greece Spain 
Guatemala Sweden 
Honduras Switzerland 
Hong Kong Thailand 
Hungary Turkey 
India United Arab Emirates 
Indonesia United Kingdom 
Ireland Venezuela 
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